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The Renormalisation Group (RG) provides a framework in which it is possible to assess whether
a deep-learning network is sensitive to small changes in the input data and hence prone to error,
or susceptible to adversarial attack. Distinct classification outputs are associated with different RG
fixed points and sensitivity to small changes in the input data is due to the presence of relevant
operators at a fixed point. A numerical scheme, based on Monte Carlo RG ideas, is proposed for
identifying the existence of relevant operators and the corresponding directions of greatest sensitivity
in the input data. Thus, a trained deep-learning network may be tested for its robustness and, if it
is vulnerable to attack, dangerous perturbations of the input data identified.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Threat to Deep Learning
Despite many successful applications, deep learning [1–
3] is poorly understood. The absence of an underlying
theory means that we cannot be certain under what cir-
cumstances a given trained network will operate correctly
and this uncertainty calls into question the use of such
networks in safety-critical applications. There is also the
possibility that slightly perturbed input data can be con-
structed that would fool the network, but not a human,
making the network susceptible to adversarial attack, or
simply cause it to misclassify and thereby conceal infor-
mation in the data [4].
It is important to distinguish between ambiguous data,
which any system, machine or human, would find difficult
to classify and data that has been imperceptibly altered
to cause the deep network to misclassify it. This paper
introduces a theoretical framework, based on the Renor-
malisation Group (RG), which specifies the conditions
under which the latter may occur and proposes a cal-
culational method for testing a trained network for this
vulnerability. Further, it determines the directions in the
space of input data along which small perturbations are
amplified by such a vulnerable deep network, causing it
to generate a qualitatively incorrect output.
The theoretical framework captures the salient features
of deep learning: the multi-layer structure, trained one
layer at a time. It is demonstrated for the specific case
in which each layer is a Restricted Boltzmann Machine
(RBM) [3] and the network is trained to classify a data
set {x} in terms of outputs {y}, whose exact conditional
probability distribution is p(y|x). However, the approach
may be extended straightforwardly to other deep net-
works and to data generation as well as classification.
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B. Analogy with the Renormalisation Group
The formal analogy between deep learning and the RG
has been noted before, although with some controversy
about whether the context should be unsupervised, or
supervised learning [5–7]. There are more fundamental
issues.
The first is that the RG applied to critical phenom-
ena describes how features of the microscopic degrees of
freedom of a system (analogous to the input data {x})
depend on length scale, successively eliminating short-
distance fluctuations and generating a sequence of effec-
tive Hamiltonians, which describe the surviving features
on larger and larger length scales. A critical point is asso-
ciated with scale-invariant fluctuations and convergence
of the sequence of effective Hamiltonians to a fixed-point
Hamiltonian which describes them. Although many ap-
plications of deep learning do involve data which exhibit
structure on different length scales, e.g., data drawn from
the physical world, and this appears to be captured by
deep learning so that it is “cheap” [6], this need not be
the case.
The second is that the RG transformation effected by
each layer of the network may be different, reflecting
the emergence of different types of features in the data,
whereas in critical phenomena each application of the
RG transformation changes the length scale by a fixed
amount.
We will assume that training of the deep network con-
verges to a conditional probability distribution that is a
good approximation to p(y|x), provided there is sufficient
number of layers. Thus, the sequence of RG transforma-
tions corresponding to applying the RBM in each layer to
the output from the hidden nodes in the previous layer,
starting with the input data, converges.
Presumably, some more generalised form of scaling
takes place in deep learning and we will assume that this
has the effect of successively scaling to smaller values all
but a finite number of eigenvalues of the Fisher Informa-
tion Matrix (FIM) of the trained deep network, so that
its spectrum is sloppy [8]. We will say more about this
in Section IV.
In Section II we introduce the RG formalism in the
2context of a deep RBM network used for classification
and, in particular, define the sequence of effective Hamil-
tonians whose fixed points and universality classes define
distinct outputs. In Section III we develop the compu-
tational scheme, based on Monte Carlo RG [9, 10], for
estimating the stability of these fixed points with respect
to the depth of the network. Section IV relates the in-
stability of a particular fixed point to direction(s) in the
input data space {x}, along which small changes in the
data cause major changes in the output probability dis-
tribution and, hence, are sources of vulnerability.
II. RENORMALISATION GROUP FOR DEEP
LEARNING
Consider a layered network of N RBMs with input
nodes h0, N−1 layers of hidden nodes hk, k = 1, . . . , N−
1, and output nodes hN . For example, the hidden nodes
may be binary vectors of the same dimension as the input
data {x} and the outputs {y}, and the joint probability
distribution for the kth layer is of the form [3]
tk(hk,hk−1) =
eh
T
k
Wkhk−1+a
T
k
hk+b
T
k
hk−1
zk
,
zk = Trhk,hk−1e
hT
k
Wkhk−1+a
T
k
hk+b
T
k
hk−1 , (1)
where Wk, ak and bk are weights determined by the
layerwise training. We will not require the precise form
of tk.
The trained deep RBM network generates the proba-
bility distribution for the output y given input data x,
qN (y|x), iteratively for k = 1, . . . , N through
qk(hk|x) = Trhk−1tk(hk|hk−1)qk−1(hk−1|x),
q0(h0|x) = δh0,x,
qN (y|x) ≈ p(y|x), (2)
where, according to Bayes Theorem,
tk(hk|hk−1) =
tk(hk,hk−1)
Trhktk(hk,hk−1)
. (3)
We define the effective Hamiltonian for the kth layer
by
qk(h|x) =
e−H
(k)
x
(h)
Z
(k)
x
,
Z(k)x = Trhe
−H(k)
x
(h). (4)
Then, the sequence of Hamiltonians is generated by the
RBMs in each layer via
e−H
(k+1)
x
(h)
Z
(k+1)
x
= Trh′tk+1(h|h
′)
e−H
(k)
x
(h′)
Z
(k)
x
, (5)
such that each Hamiltonian depends only on the previous
one in the sequence. This has the same form as an RG
transformation with kernel tk+1 [5].
At this point, it is worth noting that the input data x
determines the couplings in the space of effective Hamil-
tonians via the first layer,
e−H
(1)
x
(h)
Z
(1)
x
= t1(h|x), (6)
and the couplings in each subsequent layer are functions
solely of the couplings in the previous layer.
We parametrise the space of effective Hamiltonians in
terms of a complete set of operators Oα(h), which, in the
case of binary variables, consist of all possible products
of the components of h, with couplings gα. Thus, the
effective Hamiltonian for layer k is
H(k)x (h) =
∑
α
g(k)α Oα(h). (7)
Then the effect of the RG transformation in eq. (5) is
to define {g(k+1)} solely in terms of {g(k)} and, thereby,
to generate a flow in the coupling-constant space of the
effective Hamiltonians.
The key assumption we make is that the training of
the deep RBM network converges, so that, for N large
enough, the sequence of effective Hamiltonians converges
to a fixed point:
H∗x(h) =
∑
α
g∗αOα(h), (8)
such that
e−H
∗
x
(y)
Z∗x
= qN (y|x) ≈ p(y|x). (9)
The analogue of the RG universality class of the fixed
point H∗x is the subset of the input data, Cx, which
are associated with the same output distribution, p(y|x).
Thus, assuming the training correctly classifies the data,
x,x′ ∈ Cx ⇒ H
∗
x = H
∗
x′ (10)
and
p(y|x) 6= p(y|x′)⇒ H∗x 6= H
∗
x′ , (11)
so that there must be more than one fixed point. In
any non-trivial classification problem, there is a distinct
fixed point of the correctly trained deep network for every
distinct output.
Next, we consider the flow in coupling-constant space
close to a fixed point and, in particular, the stability
properties of the fixed point as the number of layers is
increased. We assume that the deeper the network the
more accurately it is able to learn the classification prob-
lem. Close to the fixed point {g∗}, the relationship be-
tween the couplings in adjacent layers is, to leading order,
g(k+1)α ({g
(k)}) = g(k+1)α ({g
∗})
+
∑
β
(g
(k)
β − g
∗
β)
∂g
(k+1)
α
∂g
(k)
β
∣∣∣∣∣
{g∗}
. (12)
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(k+1)
α ({g∗}) = g∗α, this becomes
g(k+1)α − g
∗
α =
∑
β
T ∗αβ(g
(k)
β − g
∗
β), (13)
where
T ∗αβ =
∂g
(k+1)
α
∂g
(k)
β
∣∣∣∣∣
{g∗}
(14)
is the stability matrix of the fixed point. The stability
properties of a fixed point determine whether it becomes
sensitive to small changes in the input data as the number
of layers is increased.
Define the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the stability
matrix by
∑
β
T ∗αβφ
(µ)
β = Λµφ
(µ)
α (15)
and express the couplings, gα, and the corresponding op-
erators, Oα(h), in the basis of eigenvectors of the stability
matrix as
gα =
∑
µ
φ(µ)α g˜µ, (16)
O˜µ(h) =
∑
α
φ(µ)α Oα(h). (17)
Then the effective Hamiltonian in this basis is
H(k)x =
∑
µ
g˜(k)µ O˜µ(h) (18)
and, close to the fixed point, from eqs (13) and (15),
H(k+1)x −H
∗
x =
∑
µ
(g˜(k+1)µ − g˜
∗
µ)O˜µ(h)
=
∑
µ
Λµ(g˜
(k)
µ − g˜
∗
µ)O˜µ(h). (19)
In the language of the RG, if Λµ > 1, O˜µ(h) is relevant
and, if Λµ < 1, it is irrelevant. In the context of deep
learning, the existence of a relevant operator at a fixed
point creates a sensitivity to input data which generate a
non-zero coupling to this operator. Such data will lead to
a probability distribution for the output which increas-
ingly deviates from the fixed-point distribution as the
network is made deeper (more layers are added). This
is the source of vulnerability of deep networks to tiny
changes in the input data which excite a relevant oper-
ator, leading to the sequence of effective Hamiltonians
converging to the wrong fixed point, i.e., misclassifying
the data.
As it stands, this provides an explanation of the po-
tential vulnerability of deep networks, but doesn’t help
to diagnose whether a particular network is susceptible.
This is because, in practice, we only have access to the
RBM weights, e.g., eq. (1), which enable us to sample
the hidden nodes and output nodes for a given input,
but don’t enable us to construct the sequence of effec-
tive Hamiltonians, or the fixed-point Hamiltonian. In
the next section, we will explain how Monte Carlo RG
methods may be used to estimate the stability matrix
T ∗αβ, defined in eq. (14), and how its eigenvalues behave
in deep networks close to the fixed point. This will be
sufficient to determine whether a particular trained deep
network has any fixed points with relevant operators.
It is worth noting that the existence of multiple fixed
points (associated with a non-trivial classification prob-
lem) does not imply the existence of relevant operators
at any of the fixed points. In the robust situation, where
no fixed point has a relevant direction, data close to the
boundary between two universality classes are simply am-
biguous and do not represent a source of adversarial at-
tack (because a human would be equally likely to mis-
classify them).
III. STABILITY OF DEEP LEARNING
Having trained a deep network of RBMs on a classifi-
cation problem whose exact solution is p(y|x), we have
available a sequence of RBMs given, for example, by
eq. (1), which enables us to use the conditional proba-
bility distributions in eq. (2) to sample the hidden nodes
in each layer and the output layer. Using this capability,
we apply methods developed for Monte Carlo RG [9, 10]
to estimate the stability matrix for each fixed point in
the space of effective Hamiltonians.
Denote by 〈Oγ〉
(k) the expectation value of the opera-
tor Oγ with respect to the effective Hamiltonian in layer
k, eq. (4), i.e.,
〈Oγ〉
(k) = TrhOγ(h)qk(h|x)
=
TrhOγ(h)e
−H(k)
x
(h)
Z
(k)
x
. (20)
We start from the chain rule applied to 〈Oγ〉
(k+1) close
to a fixed point (i.e., k ≈ N for N large),
∂〈Oγ〉
(k+1)
∂g
(k)
β
=
∑
α
∂g
(k+1)
α
∂g
(k)
β
∂〈Oγ〉
(k+1)
∂g
(k+1)
α
=
∑
α
T
(k+1)
αβ
∂〈Oγ〉
(k+1)
∂g
(k+1)
α
. (21)
Here T
(k+1)
αβ is the approximation to the stability matrix
T ∗αβ in eq. (14) obtained from the k
th layer, which should
converge to T ∗αβ for large k. Differentiating eq. (20) and
using eq. (7), we obtain for the term on the RHS of
eq. (21)
∂〈Oγ〉
(k+1)
∂g
(k+1)
α
= 〈Oγ〉
(k+1)〈Oα〉
(k+1) − 〈OγOα〉
(k+1). (22)
4To obtain a similar expression for the term on the LHS of
eq. (21), we need to use tk+1, the RBM for layer k+1, to
relate H
(k+1)
x to H
(k)
x , as in eq. (5). In Monte Carlo RG,
this is where the RG blocking step enters. We obtain
∂〈Oγ〉
(k+1)
∂g
(k)
β
= 〈Oγ〉
(k+1)〈Oβ〉
(k)
−Trhh′Oγ(h)tk+1(h|h
′)Oβ(h
′)qk(h
′|x)
= 〈Oγ〉
(k+1)〈Oβ〉
(k) − 〈Oγtk+1Oβ〉
(k).
(23)
Thus, with a suitable choice of operators, given a spe-
cific input x, by sampling the hidden nodes in the upper
layers of the network (large k) and computing a set of
expectation values of these operators, we can construct
a set of linear equations for the elements of the stability
matrix, T
(k+1)
αβ ≈ T
∗
αβ,
∑
α
T
(k+1)
αβ
[
〈Oγ〉
(k+1)〈Oα〉
(k+1) − 〈OγOα〉
(k+1)
]
= 〈Oγ〉
(k+1)〈Oβ〉
(k) − 〈Oγtk+1Oβ〉
(k). (24)
Hence, we may obtain a set of successive approximations
for the eigenvalues Λµ and eigenvectors φ
(µ)
α in eq. (15).
By varying the subset of operators used in eq. (24), we
can test the convergence of the estimates of the largest
eigenvalues of the stability matrix associated with a given
layer of the network and, by computing the eigenvalues
from successive layers, we can investigate whether in-
creasing depth of the network is associated with scaling
behaviour of the corresponding operators, as in eq. (19).
If this scaling behaviour is due to an eigenvalue of mag-
nitude greater than one, then even a tiny component of
the initial data, which creates a non-zero coupling to the
corresponding eigenvector, will cause instability of the
fixed point if the network is deep. In the next section,
we will explain how to identify the specific perturbation
of the data which does this.
IV. GENERATION OF ADVERSARIAL DATA
We consider the exact conditional probability distribu-
tion, p(y|x), and hence the trained network, qN (y|x), to
be parametrised by the input data, x, via the fixed-point
Hamiltonian in eqs (8) and (9). The Fisher Information
Matrix (FIM) [8, 11] is a metric which measures how a
probability distribution changes along different directions
in parameter space. If the fixed-point Hamiltonian has
an unstable direction due to a relevant operator, then
this will correspond to the direction in parameter space
along which the probability distribution changes fastest,
i.e., the stiffest direction. Hence, to generate adversar-
ial data we need to compute the eigenvector associated
with the largest eigenvalue of the Fisher information ma-
trix for the fixed-point probability distribution. A tiny
admixture of this component in the data will lead to er-
roneous classification if the network is too deep.
The FIM is defined in terms of the Kullback-Liebler
divergence, DKL, which is itself a measure of how dis-
tinguishable two probability distributions p1 and p2 are,
using data sampled from p1:
DKL(p1||p2) = Trxp1(x) log
[
p1(x)
p2(x)
]
. (25)
This enables us to measure the dependence of qN (y|x) on
x by considering two nearby data points, x and x′, and
expanding the Kullback-Liebler divergence as a Taylor
series in their difference [8],
DKL (qN (y|x)||qN (y|x
′)) = TryqN (y|x) log
[
qN (y|x)
qN (y|x′)
]
=
1
2
∑
ij
(x′i − xi)F
(N)
ij (x
′
j − xj)
+ . . . , (26)
where, using eqs (4), (7) and (20),
F
(N)
ij =
∂2
∂x′i∂x
′
j
DKL (qN (y|x)||qN (y|x
′))
∣∣∣∣∣
x′=x
=
〈
∂H (N)x
∂xi
∂H (N)x
∂xj
〉(N)
−
〈
∂H (N)x
∂xi
〉(N)〈
∂H (N)x
∂xj
〉(N)
=
∑
αα′
∂g(N)α
∂xi
∂g
(N)
α′
∂xj
[〈OαOα′〉
(N) − 〈Oα〉
(N)〈Oα′〉
(N)]
(27)
is the FIM.
Having chosen a subspace of operators, {Oα}, in which
to express the effective Hamiltonians in each layer of the
network (via eq. (7)), such that sufficiently precise esti-
mates of the largest eigenvalues of the stability matrix
associated with each layer, T
(k+1)
αβ , are obtained by the
method in Section III, we can compute the FIM using
the chain rule:
∂g
(N)
α
∂xi
=
∑
β
[
T (N) . . . T (2)
]
αβ
∂g
(1)
β
∂xi
. (28)
The last derivative may be computed from eq. (6) and
the explicit form of the RBM for the first layer, e.g.,
eq. (1), by expressing hT1 W1x + a
T
1 h in terms of {Oα}
to determine g
(1)
β (x). Alternatively, we may solve the
system of linear equations in eq. (24) for the first layer:
∑
α
∂g
(1)
α
∂xi
[
〈Oγ〉
(1)〈Oα〉
(1) − 〈OγOα〉
(1)
]
= TrhOγ(h)
∂
∂xi
t1(h|x). (29)
Thus, computing the FIM involves translating the input
data into the chosen coupling-constant subspace via the
5RBM in the first layer, taking the product of the stabil-
ity matrices associated with each layer in eq. (28), and
computing a set of expectation values of operators in this
subspace using the full network. The fact that the FIM
is built from the product of stability matrices connects
the scaling behaviour in eqs (13) and (19) with the slop-
piness of the FIM spectrum observed in [8], i.e., all but a
fixed number of eigenvalues of the FIM are scaled to very
small values, resulting in a fixed number of stiff (relevant)
directions and many sloppy (irrelevant) directions.
We may then obtain the eigenvector corresponding to
the largest eigenvalue of the FIM. For deep networks
which have an unstable fixed point, small perturbations
of the corresponding input data in the direction of this
eigenvector of the FIM are likely to result in the data
being misclassified.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have extended the formal analogy be-
tween deep learning and the RG. This enabled us to inter-
pret the classification problem in terms of a sequence of
effective Hamiltonians associated with the layers of the
network, whose couplings are determined by the input
data, and the convergence of this sequence to a distinct
fixed point for each distinct output of the classification
problem. Input data with the same classification should
all result in a flow in the coupling-constant space of these
effective Hamiltonians which converges to the same fixed
point.
This exposed the possibility that a fixed point might
have an unstable direction, associated with a relevant op-
erator in the language of the RG. Small perturbations of
the input data that create a non-zero overlap with such
a relevant operator tend to be amplified exponentially by
successive layers of the network, so that the flow diverges
from the correct fixed point and the data may be mis-
classified. Fixed points with no relevant operators are
not prone to this sort of error and will only misclassify
data that is ambiguous even to a human.
Convergence of the sequence of effective Hamiltonians
to a fixed point for a given subset of the input data is
guaranteed by the training (assuming this converges to a
good approximation to the exact conditional probability
distribution). The existence of a relevant direction at the
fixed point is associated with sensitivity to perturbations
which take the data outside of this subset. The size of
the amplification factor for the perturbation is greater
the greater the depth of the network. Hence, the vulner-
ability to misclassification is directly due to the depth of
a network.
The key result of this paper is a method for diagnosing
whether a given trained network is vulnerable to adver-
sarial attack, or simply misclassification due to noise in
the data, based only on computing expectation values of
operators in the hidden and output layers. The compu-
tations are fairly demanding, but may be justified for a
network that is intended for use in safety-critical appli-
cations.
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